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“Avoid trivia.”1
In April 1947, George F. Kennan was instructed by Secretary of State George Marshall to
set up a Policy Planning Staff in response to the economic crisis in Europe following World War
II. Secretary Marshall famously offered only one piece of advice to Kennan for the
unprecedented endeavor: “avoid trivia.”2 In a memo to his new team, Kennan summed up the
greatest freedoms and constraints for the potential of policy planning as an institutionalized
exercise: “Many of the questions may look so naively broad as to horrify the scholarly
economist. If so, tell your people to disregard their consciences, take a deep breath, and let us
have their best guess.”3 Despite this uncertainty, Kennan’s formation of the first Policy Planning
Staff (S/P) combined with Marshall’s advice, produced a new type of agency with a uniquely
broad policy vision. Their integration of grand strategy in policymaking was special to the S/P
and sparked a new era of U.S. policymaking exemplified by its first major accomplishment, the
Marshall Plan, and with it, the reconstruction of a crumbling Europe.
While post-war periods often witness great change, the ability of Kennan and his fiveman staff to come together across agencies to develop a uniquely interdependent U.S. policy
towards Europe’s reconstruction represented a paradigm shift in the formation of U.S. foreign
policy. In the words of Dean Acheson, the S/P has held the same role since its inception in 1947:
To anticipate the emerging form of things to come, to reappraise policies which had acquired their own
momentum and went on after the reasons for them had ceased, and to stimulate and, when necessary, to
devise basic policies crucial to the conduct of our foreign affairs.4
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John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin Books, 2007), 31.
Ibid.
3
George Kennan, “Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan) to the Assistant Secretary of
State for Economic Affairs (Thorp),” June 24, 1947, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The British
Commonwealth; Europe, Volume III, Lot 122, Box 13113.
4
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1987); Nicolas Guilhot, ed, The Invention of International Relations Theory: Realism, the
Rockefeller Foundation, and the 1954 Conference on Theory (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 290;
“Policy Planning Staff.” U.S. Department of State, n.d. http://www.state.gov/s/p/.
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However, like all institutions, the S/P has failed, succeeded, strayed, and expanded from its
defined role in its many iterations since 1947. Notably, the S/P experienced what many refer to
as its “golden-age” following the appointment of Henry Kissinger as Secretary of State in 1973,
despite the U.S. mood following the Watergate Scandal and Vietnam War.5 Kissinger’s
reputation as a prolific grand strategist and practitioner of realpolitik in the Cold War era as
National Security Advisor (1969-1975) foreshadowed the importance he would place on this
type of long-term policy analysis in his role as secretary of state.
Given Secretary Kissinger’s inclination towards grand strategy, he afforded significant
priority to the S/P during his tenure as secretary from 1973 to 1977. One of Kissinger’s first
actions as secretary was to appoint his former Special Assistant (1970-1973), Winston Lord, as
Director of the S/P.6 In my interviews with Lord, he attributed the S/P’s increased influence both
to Kissinger’s strategic and conceptual approach to foreign policy as well as the loss of executive
authority following the Watergate Crisis, which opened up space to formulate policy
independently.7
The existing literature on the S/P offers robust discussions of the utility and purpose of
long-term foreign policy planning. However, the literature fails to properly analyze the
individual efforts of the S/P, typically mentioning the 1973 to 1977 period simply as a “golden
age for policy planners.”8 Most serious academic works tend towards political science and focus
on debating the utility of policy planning over its seventy-year history, without focusing on
5

Linda Brady, “Planning for Foreign Policy: A Framework for Analysis.” International Journal XXXII, no. 4
(Autumn 1977), https://libres.uncg.edu/ir/uncg/f/L_Brady_Planning_1977.pdf; Lucian Pugliaresi and Diana T.
Berliner, “Policy Analysis at the Department of State: The Policy Planning Staff,” Journal of Policy Analysis and
Management, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Summer, 1989), pp. 379- 394 (Wiley on behalf of Association for Public Policy
Analysis and Management), accessed http://www.jstor.org/stable/3324930.
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Further, in a guest lecture given to former Policy Planning speechwriter, Charles Hill’s Yale University course
“GLBL 885: World Order”, Secretary Henry Kissinger spoke about the unique importance of Policy Planning to him
and to his conception of world geopolitical order, April 2016.
7
Interview with Winston Lord, conducted June 27, 2017 via telephone.
8
Brady, “Planning for Foreign Policy: A Framework for Analysis;” Pugliaresi and Berliner, “Policy Analysis at the
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individual contributions of the S/P to specific episodes in foreign affairs after Kennan.9 Another
genre of scholarship ignores Lord and the S/P, instead attributing policy formation directly to
Kissinger, discounting any influence from the wider bureaucracy.10 Finally, the most predictably
problematic contributions come from Kissinger himself, who sparingly discusses the S/P on only
30 pages in over 3,500 pages of his personal memoirs, exhibiting a tendency not to credit his
influencers.11
This essay contributes to existing analyses on state planning and foreign policy decisionmaking by offering a comprehensive discussion of two case studies in U.S. long-term foreign
policy planning from the perspective of Lord’s S/P. Using event-specific methodology, it is
possible to focus on Lord and this specific iteration of the S/P to determine the factors that
allowed for long-term planning’s effectiveness, and to evaluate the influence of the S/P on
9
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MUSE (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2009), http://muse.jhu.edu/chapter/1198450; Lincoln Bloomfield,
“Planning Foreign Policy: Cant It Be Done?” The Academy of Political Sciences 93, no. 3 (August 1978),
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2149530; Douglas Brinkley, ed., Dean Acheson and the Making of U.S. Foreign Policy
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993);
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Schuster trade paperbacks, 2011); Charles Stuart Kennedy and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Interview with Ambassador
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Secretary Kissinger’s individual power to shape U.S. foreign policy. By tracing a foreign policy
decision from its introduction in the State Department to a major turning point through S/P
analysis and memos, the S/P’s individual role becomes evident. In this period, the S/P took the
lead on cross-agency issues, linked operational policy decisions with established long-term U.S.
strategic principles, and most importantly had a tangible influence on the decision-making of
Secretary Kissinger.
This essay begins with a discussion of the most pertinent theoretical scholarship from
historians and political scientists on the utility and role of state planning in U.S. foreign policy,
offering definitions from political scientist Linda Brady and Lord for the two opposite operating
styles of policy planning bodies: as an academic body versus a bureaucratic actor. It then traces
the historiography of the S/P, its purpose, and its development by Kissinger and Lord. Then, this
essay utilizes two case studies, the Law of Sea (LOS) Negotiations and shifting U.S. policy
towards human rights in southern Africa, in order to follow the evolution of State Department
policy from the introduction of an issue to a major policy pronouncement.12 Although the S/P
did not serve identical roles in the two case studies, the cases serve as examples of the wideranging utility of Lord’s S/P under Kissinger. In the LOS Negotiations from 1973 to 1976, the
S/P tended towards the bureaucratic actor role, formulating day-to-day negotiating strategy,
writing speeches for Kissinger, and negotiating between competing U.S. agencies. The Africa
case study, culminating in Kissinger’s April 27, 1976 speech in Lusaka, Zaire, illuminates the
long-term strategic thinking executed within the S/P. Through the extensive use of original S/P
memos, the cases tangibly illustrate the influence of Lord and his S/P from 1973 to 1977 on the

12

Southern Africa is used throughout the S/P archives as well as this essay typically to denote South Africa and
Rhodesia (and in some cases Botswana and Zambia). Rhodesia was an unrecognized state in southern Africa from
1965 to 1979, known as the Republic of Rhodesia from 1970 onwards, and Zimbabwe in 1980.
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decision-making of Secretary Kissinger and thus on the formulation of U.S. foreign policy in the
period.
I.

The Debated Utility of the Policy Planning Staff
Despite its consistency of mission, the S/P has changed names, shrunk, and expanded, all

while exhibiting varying levels of influence on the secretary and U.S. foreign policymaking.
Most scholars acknowledge the dramatic impact of Kennan’s S/P in 1947, but many like Linda
P. Brady suggest a drastic decline of S/P influence immediately following this period,
culminating in an all-time low from 1961 to 1966 under Director Walt Rostow.13 Despite its
rejuvenation in 1973 with Kissinger’s move to the Department of State, the S/P has been both
praised and criticized, producing only a mixed evaluation of its effectiveness in the policymaking process.14
Political scientists of the 20th and 21st centuries divide their analysis of policy planning
into two general schools of thought: planning as intellectual activity and planning as political
process. Brady offers a neat framework defining both, which aligns with Lord’s own analysis.
Planning as intellectual activity, or the “Ivory Tower” school, is the “’thinker’ model of foreignpolicy planning.”15 In this model S/P responsibilities are limited to the “setting of objectives,
forecasting, post-hoc analysis, and the formulation of ‘unthinkable’ alternatives. At no point
does the staff become an active lobbyist for its proposals. Nor does the staff serve as cocoordinator of goal-setting or option-formulation activities performed by other bureaucratic
actors.” In other words, “planning is not responding to cables, not coordination, and not speech
13

Generally, under Director Walt Rostow, most S/P efforts pertaining to Vietnam went unheeded by Secretary of
State Dean Rusk. David Milne, America's Rasputin: Walt Rostow and the Vietnam War (New York: Hill and Wang,
2008).
14
Brady, “Planning for Foreign Policy: A Framework for Analysis;” Pugliaresi and Berliner, “Policy Analysis at the
Department of State: The Policy Planning Staff;” Drezner, ed., “Planning for Policy Planning;” Bloomfield,
“Planning Foreign Policy: Cant It Be Done?”
15
Kennedy and Tucker, Interview with Winston Lord, 323.
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writing.”16 Conversely, Brady and Lord define planning as political process as the “bureaucratic
actor” method or the “overly operational” model. In this second model, “planning has an impact
on policy only if planners are influential. Planners are not only thinkers, but also actors in a
bureaucratic game.”17 If policy planners do not hold bargaining chips against other bureaucratic
actors, they are unlikely to influence policy. They must advance their own analysis and advocate
within the State Department.
Lord understood these dynamics and knew that a major avenue for his own influence and
that of the S/P came through his personal relationship with Secretary Kissinger.18 As Director of
the S/P, Lord acknowledged his power when he said: “I had the carrot because I had all of the
advantages I mentioned, in terms of access to the Secretary of State and to information. The
regional and functional bureaus knew that I was obviously plugged in to the Secretary,
personally and professionally, and in terms of information.19 This relationship put Lord in a
privileged position within the State Department and elevated the role of the S/P as a mediator
and clearinghouse for agencies’ competing interests and State Department coordination.
More recent scholarship continues to comment on the period of relative influence
exhibited by Lord and the S/P from 1973 to 1977.20 In one of his first actions as secretary,
Kissinger appointed Lord as director reflecting the primacy he placed on conceptual frameworks
and long-term thinking.21 Echoing this, in one of my interviews with Lord, he asserted that the
16

Brady, “Planning for Foreign Policy: A Framework for Analysis.”
Ibid.
18
Ibid. Brady cites conversations with multiple members of the Policy Planning Staff as her source for this
information. Similarly, Lord discussed at length his personal relationship with Kissinger in his oral history,
Kennedy, Charles Stuart, Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, and Winston Lord, Interview with Winston Lord; This is reflected
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Winston Lord: Record Group 59 Entry A1-5027, National Archives II, College Park, MD.
19
Kennedy and Tucker, Interview with Winston Lord, 323.
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Ibid.
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Further, in a guest lecture given to former Policy Planning speechwriter, Charles Hill’s Yale University course
“GLBL 885: World Order”, Secretary Henry Kissinger spoke about the unique importance of Policy Planning to him
and to his conception of world geopolitical order, April 2016.
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key variant for this specific S/P was Kissinger himself and his “conceptual and strategic outlook,
which linked issues together and looked beyond the immediate crisis,” not the nature of the
issues in the 1970s.22 Similarly, Kissinger, an iconoclastic figure typically portrayed as
monolithic, secretive, and individualistic, spoke with great reverence for Lord and the work of
the S/P: “our [State Department] analytical and conceptual capabilities have been greatly
enhanced by giving the Policy Planning Staff a central position in the organization.”23 Both Lord
and many scholars attribute this period of effectiveness, in part, to Kissinger’s approach to
foreign policy as well as the close relationship between Lord and Kissinger, stemming from
Lord’s tenure as Kissinger’s Special Assistant to the National Security Advisor from 1970 to
1973.24
On the other hand, there are some who assert Lord’s tenure did not represent “goldenage” for policy planning. Richard Haass, the Director of the S/P from 2001 to 2003, discounts
the record of Lord and Kissinger as unidimensional while discussing the crises and major events,
like the end of WWII and the September 11 terrorist attacks, that make policymakers more
receptive to the ideas of policy planning:
In the 1960s and 1970s, most of the thinking in American foreign policy was contained within a paradigm –
containment – in the context of the cold war. This was not a time for producing new paradigms, but for
operating within an existing one at a refined and defined level. It was not as glorious a moment for policy
25
planning as others.

While Haass correctly identifies the Cold War era containment policy that characterized much of
foreign policymaking in the 1960s and 70s, this does not mean that policy planning was
ineffective or unable to produce new paradigms.26 In fact, many major successes of the S/P from

22

Interview with Winston Lord, conducted June 27, 2017 via telephone.
Bloomfield, “Planning Foreign Policy: Cant It Be Done?”
24
Kennedy and Tucker, Interview with Winston Lord, 100-104.
25
Drezner, ed., “Planning for Policy Planning.”
26
Under the recommendation of Diplomat George F. Kennan, the United States adopted “a policy of firm
containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counterforce at every point where they show signs
23
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1973 to 1977 came from exploiting Kissinger’s tendency to frame problems in this to advance
their own analysis and in many cases establish new paradigms, as with human rights policy and
black majority rule in southern Africa. As the two case studies show, the S/P served as a conduit
to Kissinger and thus for the formation of State Department policy on a wide range of issues,
despite its lack of operational expertise in some of these areas.
II.

Winston Lord’s Policy Planning Staff from 1973 to 1977
To analyze the 1973 to 1977 period, it is first important to note how Kissinger and Lord

changed the structure of the Policy Planning Staff after taking office in 1973.27 In a memo dated
April 10, 1974, Lord and Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Joseph Sisco laid out a
plan, “Towards a More Systematic Policy Planning Process.” The memo evolved out of a March
22 conversation between Kissinger and Lord and revealed that Kissinger requested a study to
expand the role of the S/P.28 Lord and Sisco criticized the overly operational leanings of the
State Department which prevented more imaginative, forward-thinking: “the necessary
preoccupation of the bureaus with daily decision-making absorbs their attention and often
produces a spiral of short-term solutions to immediate issues raised by you [Secretary Kissinger]
or other principals.”29 Similarly, they described the technical details required to implement a
process they name “conceptualization,” defined as the formulation of a broader framework
of encroaching upon the interest of a peaceful and stable world.” Kissinger continued this policy of containment into
the 1960s and 1970s through his engagement in proxy wars attempting to limit the spread of Communism and
minimize the Soviet sphere of influence abroad. Mr. X (George F. Kennan), “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,”
Foreign Affairs, July 1947, accessed March 1, 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russianfederation/1947-07-01/sources-soviet-conduct; John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal
of American National Security Policy during the Cold War. Rev. and expanded ed. (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2005).
27
Lord changed the name from the Office of Policy Planning to the Policy Planning Staff to realign his S/P with that
of Geroge Kennan, the first and most senior director of the S/P forty years prior. Ibid, 346.
28
Ibid.
29
Winston Lord and Joseph Sisco, “Action Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
(Sisco) and the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lord) to Secretary of State Kissinger,” April 10, 1974, Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1969 – 1976, Volume XXXVIII, Part 2, Organization and Management of the
Foreign Policy; Public Diplomacy, 1973 – 1976.

8

within which major issues are defined and policy recommendations put forward in order to
address the need to anticipate emerging form of things to come (i.e. long-term planning). 30 The
restructuring placed increased importance on the S/P and on forward-looking policy analysis,
even in regions that were not currently priorities.31 Thus, the goal of the earlier conversation and
this subsequent restructuring was to create a more systematic policy planning process by
anticipating future events and formulating a “menu” of solutions that fit within U.S. foreign
policy principles before events occurred. Rather than being reactionary, policy was to be
visionary.
Reflecting in 2017, forty years after his directorship, Lord believed that there were four
ingredients necessary for a successful S/P. Firstly, the secretary of state must be conceptual and
strategic. This means he/she is willing envision policy in the future rather than being “lawyerly”
or focused on day-to-day tactics. Secondly the director of the S/P and the secretary of state need
a close professional and personal relationship so that the S/P’s work will be received and taken
seriously. Thirdly, the S/P must have access to the best possible people, particularly emerging
stars in the State Department. Kissinger told Lord that “anyone he wanted he could get” to form
his new staff in 1973. Finally, the S/P must have access to as much information as possible.
Lord received total information from Kissinger including things that were top-secret, which
allowed him both to make the most informed analysis possible but also gave him leverage with
other Bureaus.32

30

In the memo Lord and Sisco go on to describe the technical details required to implement “conceptualization” and
the development of a framework for analysis. The suggestions include regular Analytical Staff Meetings, “devoted
to reviewing with Principals, Assistant Secretaries and others as appropriate an alert list of events or trends for then
next six months…to provide a good forum for keeping you [Kissinger] and the principals abreast of future
developments and for assuring such developments do not catch [them] off guard,” which would allow for solutions
to be formed before they were necessary to avoid inadequate reactionary responses to world issues, Ibid.
31
Ibid.
32
Interview with Winston Lord, conducted June 27, 2017 via telephone.
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To some, the newly structured S/P could appear to represent an institution designed to
reinforce Kissinger’s grand strategic frameworks. Therefore, the measure of Lord’s independent
influence rested on his ability to work within this framework to advance his and the S/P’s
viewpoints that differed from those of Kissinger. However, some assert instead that this
reinforced the “inner-circle” theory of Kissinger’s secretive politics, suggesting that Lord and the
people appointed by or serving underneath Kissinger were installed to reinforce existing
viewpoints rather than act as independent advisors.33 In other words, Kissinger controlled the
show, and those around him were simply “yes-men.” Lord displayed an understanding of both
of these concepts in his oral history:
People would come to me and ask me what kind of arguments would appeal to Kissinger and the best way
to go about approaching him. I always tried to be helpful, in the national interest and in the interests of
Kissinger and the various bureaus in the State Department that were asking my views. Also, I like to get
along with people. I thought that made me more popular but also probably more effective, if they figured
that I was cooperative, as opposed to outmaneuvering them and using my insider status to unfair
advantage.34

However, his ability to serve the interests of Kissinger, the various bureaus in the State
Department, and understanding of his privileged position of influence provides support for
Lord’s characterization as a savvy political operator working within an established bureaucracy.
Lord displayed an acute understanding of his boss’s bias, admitting that he may have
overemphasized over emphasized the East-West aspect of foreign policy, which suggested that
Lord did not seek to appease Kissinger but dealt with him effectively. 35 By understanding how
to package ideas outside the scope of Kissinger’s interests within his framework, Lord advanced
the opinions and policies of the S/P and other bureaus within the State Department.
In a final example to establish Lord’s independence from Kissinger, Lord conducted
certain actions of the S/P without Kissinger’s approval. In the original 1973 memo reorganizing
33

Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992).
Kennedy and Tucker, Interview with Winston Lord, 328.
35
Ibid, 338.
34
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the S/P, Lord and Sisco concluded by advocating for greater transparency and information
sharing despite Kissinger’s well-known preference for secrecy. Lord took it upon himself to
review what happened at meetings with Kissinger at regular staff meetings of the S/P as a
management tactic and to boost team morale. Lord understood the significance of this practice:
I never let Kissinger know how much I was telling all of my people. I needed their help; I needed their
thinking. This, in turn, helped Kissinger and the national interest. I wanted to promote good morale. I also
told them that, because of the sensitivity of some of the subjects, I counted on their discretion.36

By acknowledging that this practice was contrary to Kissinger’s wishes, Lord provides concrete
evidence for his ability to act independently from Kissinger, despite their close relationship.
While it is clear Lord influenced the structure and scope of the S/P during his tenure as
director, it is more complicated to examine his influence on policy formulation and on the
decision-making of Kissinger. It is also important to note that it is difficult to disaggregate the
efforts of the S/P staff and of Lord himself, as all S/P memos came through Lord to Kissinger.
However, the goal of this essay will be to use to an event-specific methodology to
chronologically trace the efforts of Lord’s S/P. The following sections will trace two case
studies—the Law of Sea Treaty negotiations from 1973 to 1976 and shifting U.S. policy towards
human rights in southern Africa—in order to analyze the successes and mechanisms by which
the S/P was able to influence the U.S. foreign policymaking of Kissinger.
III.

Law of the Sea Negotiations from 1973 to 197637

“No current international negotiation is more vital for the long-term stability and prosperity of
our globe.”38
-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger

36

Ibid, 327-328.
Figure 1 in the Appendix offer visual representations of the many terms used to describe different levels of ocean
jurisdiction and the “exclusive economic zone” concept that will appear throughout this section.
38
Speech by Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State, to American Bar Association Annual Convention, “International
Law, World Order, and Human Progress,” Montreal, Canada, August 11, 1975, University of Minnesota, accessed
https://hdl.handle.net/2027/umn.31951d02488168t?urlappend=%3Bseq=3.
37
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One of the major contributions and institutional roles of the S/P was to take the lead on
issues that cut across the interests of several bureaus or agencies. The preparation and execution
of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) negotiations
spanned the Office of the Legal Adviser of the Department as well as military and economic
bureaus. Given that Secretary Kissinger attended the 1973 UNCLOS III planning meeting in
New York City and again in 1976, the S/P was heavily involved in the formulation of U.S. policy
and the synthesis of many different bureaus’ policymaking process. Lord believed his staff was
uniquely able to act as an “honest broker…looking at the issue from the global perspective of the
President and the Secretary of State.”39 Given the lack of international consensus on the issue of
the seas, the LOS negotiations still remained uncharted waters. 40 As a result, U.S. policy was
formulated from the ground-up by the S/P, culminating in a speech by Secretary Kissinger on
April 8, 1976.
The LOS negotiations of the 1970s represented a culmination of over thirty years of
uncertainty with regards to international sea rights. With the Truman Proclamation of September
28, 1945, the U.S. set off what is referred to as a great “sea rush,” claiming continental shelves as
territory and developing plans to exploit marine resources in indeterminate areas. This declared
the natural resources of the subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf beneath the seas and
contiguous to American coasts as belonging to the U.S., subject to its jurisdiction and control. In
the words of Jorge Coquia, a member of the Philippine delegation of UNCLOS III and Chairman
of the delegation of the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea, “the United States, in effect,
claim[ed] all resources of a sea area over 700,000 square miles,” and in response, “many other

39

Kennedy and Tucker, Interview with Winston Lord, 334.
Before UNCLOS III, the international community had convened for previous U.N. Conventions on the Law of the
Sea, namely UNCLOS I in 1958 and UNCLOS II in 1960. Both conferences produced very little consensus and
were considered unsuccessful.
40
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States followed suit but laid claims much more than what was asserted by the United States.”
Problematically for the developing world, Coquia wrote that for the next four decades, “the
States that could not exploit [deep sea resources] due to lack of technological resources needed a
law to protect them against abuses by exploitation of other States.”41 As pressure to the
historical status quo mounted and developing countries remained unprotected, the international
community convened for UNCLOS III in 1973.42
The first U.S. response to these newfound trends was NSSM 125 issued by President
Nixon in 1970. The President assigned a newfound importance to the issue of the oceans on the
basis that “the law of the sea is inadequate to meet the needs of modern technology and the
concerns of the international community. If it is not modernized multilaterally, unilateral action
and international conflict are inevitable.”43 A new system was required. While calling for an
immediate treaty renouncing all national claims over resources of the seabed beyond 200 meters
in depth, Nixon announced his vision to establish “international machinery” that would
“authorize and regulate the exploration and use of seabed resources beyond the continental
margins.”44 The U.S. sought to hold territorial sea lines through an international agreement,
rather than simply by continuing to assert its customary rights through the insulation of military
defense. U.S. principles sought to ensure the highest levels of free trade and to avoid the
possibility of nations demanding travel tariffs for passage through important commercial straits.
In brief, NSSM 125 outlined U.S. national security interests, advocated for the highest level of
41

Jorge R Coquia, Development of and Significance of the 200-Mile Exclusive Economic Zone,” Selected essays on
the law of the sea (Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines: Published for the Secretariat to the Cabinet Committee on the
Law of the Sea Treaty by the Development Academy of the Philippines Press, 1982), 29-35.
42
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State, to Richard Nixon, the President, National Security Study Memorandum
125 (NSSM 125): U.S. Oceans Policy, July 22, 1971, accessed https://20012009.state.gov/documents/organization/78292.pdf.
43
President Richard Nixon, “Statement About United States Oceans Policy,” May 23, 1970, Office of the Historian,
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969 – 1976, Volume E-1, Documents on Global Issues, 1969 – 1972,
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/52602.pdf.
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freedom of navigation, defined U.S. economic, environmental, scientific, and conflict resolution
principles, and finally laid out options for the upcoming negotiations.
Even before Kissinger became the secretary of state in 1973 he had begun work on LOS
policy. As National Security Advisor, he sent a memo on July 22, 1971, to President Nixon
analyzing NSSM 125 with a section titled, “My Views.” Kissinger stated that the he believed
“the most important question facing us at this time is how to generate broad multilateral support
for a law of the sea which protects those aspects of our positions which are vital to us, namely a
12-mile territorial sea and free transit through straits,” in order to maintain the greatest freedom
of navigation possible.45 One of the most important issues that continued to be negotiated was
the U.S. seabeds initiative, which was originally based on the shape of the continental shelf but
deemed unfair by Kissinger. Instead, the negotiating delegation (and thus the S/P) were given
the authority to explore a different formula for the outer limit of the so-called “trusteeship zone”
and the profit sharing by developing nations that it entailed.46 The major analyses initiated by
Kissinger’s 1971 memo would be “a study of what we can do through carrots and sticks to
persuade individual countries to take more accommodating L.O.S. positions,” combined with a
high level diplomatic campaign designed to seek multilateral support and avoid unilateral
claims.47 It was from this base laid by Kissinger that the S/P took over in 1973.
Although discussion of U.S. LOS policy was underway in 1970 and continued throughout
both Lord’s and Kissinger’s tenures, it would take until 1982 for the negotiation teams to nail
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down a final agreement on the entire LOS treaty.48 This delay illustrates some of the limitations
of the S/P as an institution as well as the restraints of grand strategic foreign policy planning.
There is inherent difficulty associated with negotiations requiring international cooperation over
shared resources. As Kissinger noted, the LOS negotiations were extremely important and
highly complex. Additionally, bureaucratic timelines and term limits can further inhibit the
ability of an S/P or State Department to engage in long-term planning. Although the S/P’s
mandate was long-term foreign policy, its effectiveness, particularly in the LOS negotiations,
was often in the tackling of day-to-day problems within a long-term framework. In the words of
Dean Acheson, they looked “beyond the vision of the operating officers caught in the smoke and
crises of current battle; far enough ahead to see the emerging form of things to come and outline
what should be done to meet or anticipate them.”49 This necessitated daily and weekly changes
of strategy all while working towards the grander U.S. principles of freedom of navigation and
limiting regulation power of other nations.
Preparation for the 1974 Caracas Meeting of the UNCLOS III
After Kissinger became secretary of state in 1973, the direction of U.S. LOS negotiations
fell on Ambassador John R. Stevenson, the President’s Special Representative for the Law of the
Sea Negotiations, John Norton Moore, the Chairman of the NSC Interagency Task Force on
LOS, and Lord. From the beginning, the S/P recognized its role as a coordinator between
agencies and on the bureaucratic and political problems of the LOS negotiations. In a November
27, 1973, briefing memorandum, Lord outlined the initial disputes on the U.S. side, which
inhibited progress towards a realistic and comprehensive negotiating position:
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Strong disagreement is apparent between the agencies, particularly between Treasury (Secretary Schultz)
and Interior. OMB [Office of Management and Budget] (Director Ash) and CEA [Council of Economic
Advisors] generally have sided with Treasury, while most of the other agencies share the views of Interior.
This disagreement focuses on the nature of the international control over the exploitation of seabed
resources.50

Most nations preferred a strong international seabed regime covering waters beyond 200 miles
and exclusive coastal state economic jurisdictions over mineral and living resources to 200 miles,
along with royalties on seabed minerals.51 This engendered opposition towards the U.S. support
for non-exclusive coastal state economic claims, limited royalties, and a weak regulating body,
which was viewed as the most conservative of any participant. At this point in 1973, the U.S.
recognized that they were in a minority position internationally and needed multilateral support.
This would require willingness to compromise on non-vital interests moving into the Caracas
Conference in 1974.
The Caracas Conference of 1974 represented a moment of excitement in the international
community. However, this was short lived. Gary H. Knight, American LOS expert and member
of the NSC’s Inter-Agency Task Force on the LOS, wrote that “disillusionment was quick in
coming, and the conference was, as ocean law expert William T. Burke puts it ‘about as exciting
as watching paint dry.’”52 As a firsthand U.S. observer, Knight concluded that it was not
surprising no agreements were reached in Caracas, given the level of disagreement between the
developed and developing nations. More problematically, according to Knight “the Caracas
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session did not bring the parties any closer together.”53 Both Knight and the S/P identified this
divide as a defining characteristic of the Caracas Conference, and perhaps the entirety of the
LOS negotiations: “East-West ideological issues were replaced by a new polarization – the
‘North-South split.’ The nations of the North (Eastern and Western Europe, the Soviet Union,
the United States, Canada, Japan, and Australia) have common views on most of the issues…
The nations of the South (the developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America) likewise
have similar perspectives.” More specifically, the North emphasized freedoms: freedom of
navigation, freedom of scientific research, freedom from pollution of the marine environment.
The South emphasized resources: exclusive access to fish, oil, and gas off their coasts, and
exclusive management authority and regulation within a broad coastal area.54
The U.S. believed that an international treaty was necessary to avoid international
conflict and harm to U.S. interests as nations increasingly asserted unilateral claims to more
ocean area. These considerations reflected Lord’s bureaucratic proclivities displayed throughout
his career, but explicitly stated in a 1974 speech to the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco:
The time of easy choices for this nation is gone. Accustomed to relative self-sufficiency, we now face the
reality which has confronted Europe, Japan and most other nations for decades – dependence on an open,
cooperative international system for national growth. America must reconcile its national and global
goals.55

The reconciliation of national and global goals would prove to be both an essential criteria and
barrier to the negotiations. This translated into subsequent negotiating strategy as the U.S.
sought to achieve a settlement of existing and potential conflict over ocean uses through a
compromise package, which would satisfy major powers while also appeasing the developing
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countries.56 After the 1974 Caracas conference, U.S. strategy shifted. The U.S. agreed to greater
coastal state control over offshore resources in order to appease coastal states. However, these
concessions were contingent upon reservation of traditional international rights within the areas
subject to coastal state jurisdiction. In effect, the U.S. sought to establish a balance between
coastal states’ demand for increased rights and the international community’s rights regarding
navigation, scientific research, and other non-resource uses.57
Given the relatively unsuccessful nature of the 1974 Caracas session, it is unsurprising
that the U.S. Senate and other states began to look favorably on unilateral extension of
jurisdiction, which the S/P recognized would negatively affect their ability to conduct
negotiations. The S/P and LOS negotiators stood at odds with the will of Congress. As such,
subsequent negotiating objectives focused as much on international negotiation as they did on
domestic concerns. The S/P LOS issue paper from 1974 concluded by laying out options for all
treaty sections, and summarized that in preparation for the 1975 session, “we should continue to
oppose the unilateral 200-mile fisheries bill and the unilateral Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Bill in
the U.S. Congress and we will work closely with Congress to gain maximum support for an
acceptable treaty.”58 The S/P understood where Congressional opinion lay, but determined that
it did not align with long-term U.S. principles.
Throughout this period, LOS negotiations became more and more of a priority within the
State Department and within the S/P. However, it is worth noting that until 1975, all LOSrelated memos from Lord were directed not to Secretary Kissinger, but to Robert Ingersoll, the
deputy secretary. It would take two full years from the first LOS conference in 1973 until late
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1975 for Secretary Kissinger to take personal notice and until late 1976 before Secretary
Kissinger took a lead role in negotiations. Following the failed Caracas conference in 1974, the
S/P conducted an analytical staff meeting (without Secretary Kissinger present) in order to focus
on three objectives: 1) U.S. security and straits objectives; 2) the deep seabed regime; and 3) the
outstanding issues of the economic zone, i.e. 200-mile exclusive economic zone versus a
“trusteeship zone.” The S/P’s goal was to set objectives and priorities for the negotiations,
which would prove to be a primary role throughout the negotiations.59
Secretary Kissinger and the Law of the Sea Conference: 1976 New York Session
“The current negotiation may thus be the world’s last chance.” 60 -Henry Kissinger, 1975
In advance of the March 1976 session in New York, Secretary Kissinger took a more role
in the LOS negotiations, in his own words, to “promote significant and rapid progress in this
vitally important negotiation.”61 His participation began on August 11, 1975, with a speech in
front of the American Bar Association’s annual convention elevating the importance of the LOS
conference within his overarching framework for foreign policy, which focused on international
order and stability. Discussions within the S/P and the subsequent speeches focused heavily on
the geopolitical magnitude of the LOS negotiations. This speech—like many to follow—
featured nearly identical language to the S/P memo from September 10, 1974, reflecting the
S/P’s influence in defining U.S. LOS principles.
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In 1974 and 1975, public remarks by both Lord and Kissinger reflected similar thought
processes about the state of world affairs as one of unprecedented interdependence. Lord
advocated for multilateral solutions. Kissinger focused more heavily on international law and
global order: “An international order can be neither stable nor just without accepted norms of
conduct. International law both provides a means and embodies our ends… The challenge of
international order takes an unprecedented urgency in the contemporary world of
interdependence.”62 With this in mind, Kissinger’s 1975 speech in Montreal reasserted U.S.
commitment to freedom of navigation through international straits on the basis of free trade and
international security, while conceding a 12-mile territorial sea, and maintaining U.S. opposition
to the non-discriminate 200-mile exclusive economic zone. Kissinger opposed all domestic steps
towards unilateral legislation on the basis that the “world simply cannot afford to let the vital
questions before the Law of the Sea conference be answered by default,” and further elevated the
importance of the LOS negotiations using almost identical rhetoric to the September 1974 S/P
memo: “We are at one of those rare moments when mankind has come together to devise means
of preventing future conflict and shaping its destiny, rather than to solve a crisis that has
occurred to deal with the aftermath of war. It is a test of vision and will, and of statesmanship. It
must succeed.”63 By lending his stature and grand strategic rhetoric to the LOS negotiations,
Kissinger successfully inspired greater cooperation of negotiating parties in advance of the 1976
Conference in New York.64
The S/P continued to strategically use Secretary Kissinger’s participation in the LOS
process to gain multilateral support for a basic compromise package and requested his
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participation at the next 1976 LOS Conference in New York.65 Deep seabed mining, a fraught
issue area, would be the focus in New York, but the outlook was promising; many developing
countries were making proposals that hinted at willingness to compromise. As such, Lord
suggested that Kissinger’s continued participation at the conference “would be underlining the
political importance the US attaches to these negotiations… to establish common ground
between the two groups [developed and less developed nations].”66 Over the next few months,
the S/P prepared Kissinger’s remarks, while simultaneously evaluating Congress’ recent passage
of the “200-mile unilateral fisheries bill,” opposed by the State Department for its potential
negative effects on foreign policy and the U.S. negotiating position.67 The proposed speech as of
mid-March 1976 touched on the importance of interdependence, outlined major U.S. demands
including a 12-mile territorial sea, a 200-mile economic zone with freedom of navigation,
freedom of navigation through international straits, the protection of the marine environment,
and provided a preview of the U.S. negotiating position on deep seabed mining.68
In consultation with the lead negotiator of the LOS negotiations, Ambassador Learson,
the S/P continued to take the lead on formulating U.S. negotiating strategy. The long-term
analysis and historical knowledge of international relations housed within the S/P made it a
perfect body for such analysis. Lord asserted that the U.S. negotiation strategy before
Kissinger’s speech “would be to obtain early in the session a wider consensus for the
compromise package. We would specifically ask one of the two key LDC countries, probably
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Brazil…whether they would publicly come forward and agree on the broad outlines of the
package if it had your active personal support.” Similarly, throughout the LOS negotiations Lord
displayed his aptitude for evaluating Congressional and public support on behalf of Kissinger:
“We could also discuss the package with appropriate Hill leaders to obtain their support and
understanding. Also we could take soundings with industry leaders to urge their support…to
help undercut the possible opposition by some agencies.”69 In the days leading up to Secretary
Kissinger’s speech, the S/P focused their efforts on this tension.
Although the S/P served primarily as a long-term planning body, the pace at which the
LOS negotiations moved and changed required a different type of role. The S/P essentially
defined for Secretary Kissinger his participation in the process he deemed to be so vital to
international world order. As an example, Secretary Kissinger’s major participatory moment in
the conference came in the form of an April 8, 1976, speech in New York. However, U.S. policy
was set just two weeks prior on March 22, 1976. The S/P sent a LOS strategy paper outlining
long-term U.S. interests and the negotiating strategies recommended to secure these interests in
the day-to-day LOS negotiations. The S/P continued to direct negotiating policy, which is a dayto-day endeavor, in order to advance long-term strategic goals as presented in Kissinger’s public
addresses—the more typical role of the S/P.
In the 1976 strategy paper, Lord advocated for compromise: both North-South
cooperation between industrialized and the less developed countries and also between the State
and Treasury Department. For North-South cooperation, Lord highlighted that the issue of deep
seabed mining and the establishment of a governing regime to ensure revenue sharing, which had
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become a part of the LDCs’ conception of a “new economic order.”70 For the conflict with
Treasury, described by both Harvard negotiation expert James Sebenius and by Lord, Treasury
did not want to accept any kind of limitations on U.S. production or exploitation of deep sea
resources, which the S/P had deemed acceptable as part of the compromise package.71 To
address both of these facts, and to gain Kissinger’s buy-in, Lord asserted that compromise with
the less developed countries (LDCs) was inevitable, and allowed for certain concessions backed
by guarantees in return. These included guaranteed access to seabed resources for LDCs in
exchange for some developed country control over the policy machinery of the to-be-established
International Seabed Regulation Authority (ISRA), limitation of ISRA’s powers, and
establishment of a dispute settlement procedure. In Lord’s analysis these concessions and
guarantees satisfied “our basic objectives, but frankly [do] not give us everything we want on
every issue.”72 However, the S/P concluded that this was the best U.S. could do while still
securing the necessary conditions for effective access to seabed minerals and the protection of
military and security interests.
With these inter-agency problems in mind, Lord and the S/P spent the next two weeks
trying to serve as the State Department’s “honest broker,” finding compromise and cooperation
between the S/P, Treasury, and the LOS Delegation in New York. The State Department needed
Kissinger’s April 8 speech to present a united front to move the conference forward on the
seabeds issue rather than creating more confusion. Just four days before the speech, the S/P had
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resolved two of the four major issues; they found agreement for support of a voting system
within ISRA that reflected relative economic importance and determined that the U.S. would not
support an adjustment assistance program to help adversely affected land-based producers
financed by direct national contributions. However, the limitation of deep-sea mineral
production and the role of ISRA in possible deep-sea commodity agreements still remained
contentious with Treasury.
In a minor setback, a follow-up memo sent the next day on April 5, informed Kissinger
that the LOS Delegation and Ambassador Learson were forced out of necessity to undertake an
ad referendum negotiation and accepted a version of the production limitation and role for
possible future commodity agreements on their own, which went beyond what was contemplated
by the S/P, despite the S/P’s clear instruction to the delegation to hold the line.73 Strategy had to
change quickly. Again, it was the S/P that designed the State Department’s policy towards this
new development. The new compromise plan proposed by the S/P allowed for these concessions
made by Ambassador Learson while maintaining “non-discriminatory access to the area under
the so-called ‘banking system,’” contingent on a satisfactory ISRA Executive Council being
formed. These new policies directly became Kissinger’s talking points.74
Three days later on April 8, 1976, it was the day of Kissinger’s LOS Conference address
titled “The Law of the Sea: A Test of International Cooperation.” Organized almost identically
to the S/P strategy paper from March 22, the speech touched on the importance of the oceans, the
progress of the LOS negotiations to date, and outlined a range of unresolved issues and U.S.
73
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solutions. For marine scientific research the U.S. agreed to a reasonable balance between coastal
state and international interests in the economic zone (up to 200 miles, as can be seen in Figure 1
in the Appendix). In terms of a dispute settlement mechanism, the U.S. proposed the
establishment of an impartial body whose findings would be binding on all signatory states in
order to have a non-political, rapid, and impartial judge. Finally, in respect to the “most complex
and vital issue remaining,”—deep seabeds—the U.S. voiced support for the establishment of an
International Seabed Resource Authority (ISRA) with limited jurisdiction and an executive
council to represent the “producer and consumer interests of those states most concerned with
seabed mining,” non-discriminatory access for states and their nationals to deep seabed
resources, support for a system of revenue sharing (a top-priority LDC demand), and, to address
the major LDC concern, technology transfer system for developing countries to share deep
seabed mining technology.75
Lord concluded Kissinger’s speech in typical Kissinger fashion by elevating the
importance of the LOS negotiations to that of utmost geopolitical importance: “If the Conference
is successful, mankind’s rights and responsibilities with regard to the oceans will be clear to
all…it will mean the nations of the world have proved that the challenges of the future can be
solved cooperatively; that, for the first time mankind has been able to surmount traditional
enmities and ambitions in the service of a better vision.”76 While reiterating his hope for a
successful April Conference, Kissinger may have foreshadowed its subsequent failure by
announcing that if a second session is necessary this year that the president asked him to lead the
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U.S. delegation himself. Now, in 1976, the President himself adopted the preferred tactic of the
S/P, to use Kissinger’s participation as a tool on the international negotiating stage.
Although the LOS negotiations would not produce a final treaty until December 10,
1982, in Montego Bay, Jamaica, the contributions of the S/P towards negotiating strategy and
defining Kissinger’s participation were a major influence for the 1982 treaty. Given the
unsuccessful outcome of the 1976 conference, Lord wrote a statement on behalf of Kissinger that
reiterated the work left to be done on the regime for mining deep seabed minerals, the nature of
the “economic zone,” provisions for marine scientific research in the economic zone, and the
rights of landlocked and geographically disadvantaged states in the economic zone.77 However,
the eventual treaty (although rejected by President Ronald Reagan because of its bias towards
principles of the developing world’s “new international economic order”) represented a success
for the S/P and for Kissinger’s grand strategy, even after both had left office. The treaty
included many policies originally designed by Lord’s S/P and subsequently announced by
Kissinger in his various addresses.78 The 1982 LOS Treaty called for technology transfers and
wealth transfers from developed to underdeveloped nations; it required signatories to adopt
regulations and laws to control pollution of the marine environment; and established a 12-mile
territorial sea limit and a 200-mile exclusive economic zone limit. Finally, the treaty established
the International Seabed Authority, which included a Council based on relative economic
power.79 The principles defined between 1973 and 1976 formed the basis of U.S. participation in

77

Winston Lord, Director of Policy Planning, to Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State, “Wrap-Up of the Law of the
Sea Negotiations,” September 17, 1976, Box 355, S/P Files of Winston Lord: Record Group 59 Entry A1-5027,
National Archives II, College Park, MD.
78
The United Nations Law of the Sea Treaty Information Center, National Center for Public Policy Research,
http://www.unlawoftheseatreaty.org/42.html.
79
“United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982,” United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm.

26

the 1982 treaty and thus the S/P succeeded in shaping U.S. policy and the global treaty through
Kissinger’s participation in UNCLOS III.
Given the similarities from S/P memo to major Kissinger speech, lack of analytical staff
meetings between the S/P and Kissinger, and Kissinger’s limited consultations with the Treasury
Department or Department of Defense leading up to his participation in the 1976 New York LOS
Conference it is clear that he placed a great deal of responsibility on Lord and the S/P to be the
main body within the State Department for LOS policy formulation. To highlight the ultimate
decision-making power exercised by the S/P it is critical to emphasize some of the most
important similarities between Kissinger’s April 8th speech and the S/P memos leading up to it.
Kissinger adopted the S/P view that a stalemate at UNCLOS III represented a worst-case
scenario for all parties; all policy proposals related to the deep sea mining regime and the
establishment of the ISRA came straight from the March 4th Strategy memo prepared by the S/P;
and, perhaps most importantly, Kissinger’s ultimatums insinuating unilateral U.S. mining in the
face of stalemate originated from S/P analysis that other nations were growing impatient and
could force the U.S.’s hand through their own unilateral claims.80
The S/P’s effectiveness can be attributed to a few reasons. As suggested by Lord and
scholars like Brady, one reason was the inter-agency nature of the LOS negotiations; LOS
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negotiations represented a functional issue, rather than a regional one.81 Lord and the S/P
negotiated day-to-day strategy while framing and solving problems within the context of a
grander framework for geopolitical stability.82 Finally, the lack of meaningful historical U.S.
engagement with the UNCLOS allowed the S/P to form policy from the ground up. In this new
issue area, in which Secretary Kissinger voluntarily played a passive if important role, U.S. LOS
policy and negotiation strategy came directly from the pens of Lord and his S/P.
IV.

Human Rights in Southern Africa and Secretary Kissinger’s 1976 Lusaka, Zambia
Speech: A Liberal Cause Turned Operational Policy

It would not have been predicted by any observer of American politics that a Republican
administration would take the lead in bringing about the breakthrough to majority rule in
Southern Africa. Majority [black] rule had been a liberal cause, never translated into an
operational policy.83
-Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal
The complexity and extended timeline of the LOS negotiations limited the overall impact
that Lord’s S/P could exert on the final treaty process. Although they were able to shape day-today negotiating strategy within the larger framework of long-term U.S. interests, given that the
treaty would not be finalized until 1982, it is difficult to attribute full credit to Lord’s S/P for the
treaty’s success. However, the change in U.S. human rights policy towards southern Africa
provides an example of the S/P successfully shaping U.S. foreign policy to reflect their own
internal analysis, which differed from the opinions of Secretary Kissinger. Kissinger’s April 27,
1976, speech in Lusaka, Zaire represented a clear declaration that U.S. policy towards human
rights in Africa had changed forever and that the S/P successfully influenced Kissinger’s
decision-making.
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In a short two years, from 1974 to 1976, Kissinger and the State Department shifted from
a moderately ambivalent and uninterested attitude towards human rights in southern Africa to
markedly more active and explicit promotion of black majority rule in South Africa and
Rhodesia. Until this point, the U.S. operated under a Nixon administration policy insensitively
referred to as the “Tar Baby option.” 84 A secret Nixon Administration document outlined the
policy: “we would maintain public opposition to racial repression but relax political isolation and
economic restrictions on the white [ruled] states.”85 In line with this, Kissinger sought to
maintain geopolitical stability by supporting the status quo in Africa.86 Almost twenty-five years
after the fact, Kissinger admitted in Years of Renewal, the drastic change in U.S. policy from the
“Tar Baby option” to the Lusaka speech was an unusual evolution of policy because it
represented a relative 180-degree turn towards Africa, specifically Rhodesia.
As early as 1974, the U.S. began facing increased pressure from Congress, the American
public, and international actors alike to address human rights abuses of allies worldwide as well
as to clarify U.S. policy towards Africa. Congress began its campaign by demanding reduced
economic and military aid to nations with visibly bad human rights records. Similarly, Francis
Kornegay in a 1985 piece for Africa Report summed up public opinion of Kissinger’s Africa
policy as an “admitted ‘non-policy’ towards Africa,” making reference to Kissinger’s admission
to the Congressional Black Caucus that he had no Africa policy at all.87 Relatedly, on April 19,
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1975, (ironically, just a year before Kissinger would speak in Lusaka, Zambia on Kaunda’s
invitation) President Kenneth D. Kaunda of Zambia stated that, “what gives Zambia and Africa
great cause for concern is America’s policy towards Africa, or is it the lack of it?”88 Kaunda was
correct. An S/P memo from 1975, ranked South Africa as a third tier priority in a ranked matrix
of political/security interest to the United States, less important than Australia, India, or
Algeria.89 Historian Thomas Borstelmann offers an explanation: “[Nixon’s and Kissinger’s]
focus on powerful nations and their lack of interest in weaker ones meant that Africa would
always rank low in their priorities,” but for the same reasons it meant that as the only
industrialized state on the continent with a modern military force that South Africa would get
special attention.90 While it could be argued the growing discontent of Congress, the American
public, and presidents like Kenneth Kaunda caused Kissinger’s shift in ideology, this was not
entirely the case.91
Throughout this period of heavy criticism, Secretary Kissinger displayed an unwavering
public preference for non-interference, a desire to block Congressional imposition on foreign
policy, and at times a willingness to ignore outside opinion completely. Secretary Kissinger
outlined his general view on human rights issues in his first discussion on the topic with eight
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members of Congress on December 17, 1974, organized by the heavily human rights-focused
democratic Congressman Donald Fraser:
Some countries in certain circumstances must be supported no matter how unpleasant it might seem… In
determining values we must first define our terms. American institutions cannot be automatically translated
and made meaningful to every country in the world…We try to take human rights issues into consideration
as long as they do not interfere with our national security.92

Again in 1975, when speaking to the authoritarian Chilean Prime Minister, Kissinger infamously
stated: “I hold the strong view that human rights are not appropriate in a foreign policy
context.”93 Furthermore, Keys attests to Kissinger’s uncompromising ideology on human rights
internationally: “despite recommendations from key advisers to meet Congress halfway or to
make an effort to appear cooperative, Kissinger repeatedly torpedoed efforts at even the most
minimal accommodation.” However, she alludes to the influence that Winston Lord and the S/P
would play over the next two years in this arena:
Yet, despite Kissinger’s dogged efforts to undermine it…the Bureau during his tenure performed an
important educative function, inculcating a new mindset, establishing new diplomatic precedents and
procedures, and setting in motion the process through which human rights became a normal part of foreign
policy considerations.94

Given the indifference felt towards the region, particularly in terms of human rights issues, the
evolution of U.S. policy towards Africa and specifically southern Africa provides an example of
the S/P’s success against Kissinger’s “dogged efforts,” to keep human rights out of U.S. foreign
policy.
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Explanations for Kissinger’s shifted position on human rights in Rhodesia and South
Africa remain mixed. Many historians argue a deterministic narrative for Kissinger’s shift.
Historian Hanes Walton Jr. writes that, “Kissinger policy didn’t just change itself; events and the
role of African nation-states led, in part, to the evolution of a shift in the role that Kissinger had
defined for African nation-states.” 95 Jeremi Suri posits that human rights were part of
Kissinger’s realpolitik but only as a means to achieve international stability, and only in the
European context.96 Historians like Alex Thomson and Borstelmann attribute Kissinger’s shift
to Portugal’s retreat from Angola: “The anti-Communist white-ruled states were now down to
two – South Africa and Rhodesia,” which led Kissinger to fear the fall of Rhodesia to the Soviets
and to the realization that ‘“what is required, then…is a preemptive strategy” to take the
momentum away from the Soviets and Cubans.”’97 While some of the shift must be attributed to
events on the continent like the Portuguese retreat from Angola and increased pressure on the
few white settler states left in Africa, this explanation discount the S/P’s role in reaching the
Lusaka speech and the policies it announced, instead attributing the switch entirely to
necessity.98 Despite these events, Nixon and Kissinger generally continued their policy of
opposition towards systems based on racial discrimination while refusing to “put more than a
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token element of Washington’s power behind eliminating them.”99 Through declassified State
Department documents and conversation transcripts, it is clear that the personal ideology of Lord
and S/P analysis from 1974 to 1976 played a critical role in convincing Kissinger to pay more
attention to human rights in Rhodesia and South Africa, outside of the events in Angola.
Contrary to these deterministic explanations, as early as 1974, before Portugal’s retreat
from Angola, the S/P understood that there were questions “about the adequacy of our machinery
for dealing with [human rights problems],” as well as “the need for a more coordinated approach
to policy-making on these proliferating issues in order to make sure that what we do in one area
does not contradict or undermine what we are trying to do.”100 In response, the S/P took the lead
for the State Department and conducted an analytical staff meeting followed by a comprehensive
S/P study on human rights issues written on October 22, 1974.101 It was the S/P that first
demonstrated an understanding that the widespread criticism of human rights policy and lack of
policy towards Africa necessitated change. Through a combination of Kissinger’s desire for
international stability, pressure from Congress following the Angola crisis, and most importantly,
S/P analysis and prodding, Kissinger drastically would drastically change his calculus.
Understanding Lord’s Motivations
“Leaders must grasp the basic forces at work in the world and impart this vision to their
peoples. The public does not expect instant solution. But it must be confident that the problems
are understood and that they are being addressed.” 102
-Winston Lord
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As early as 1974, the S/P took the lead on human rights issues as early as 1974, drafting
the 30-page analytical study titled “U.S. Policies on Human Rights and Authoritarian Regimes.”
This document was circulated to Kissinger multiple times over the two-year period from both
Lord and through Deputy Secretary Bob Ingersoll who advocated for it to be disseminated to the
field.103 Nevertheless, it took until July 7th, 1975, before Kissinger agreed to take action, signing
his initials to authorize an analytical staff meeting on the issue of human rights.104 At the time of
its release, the document advocated vaguely for, “a coherent definition of our [U.S.] world
posture on human rights as part of our overall foreign policy along with a realistic flexibility in
the application of that posture to a variety of situations and contexts,” and provided four policy
options ranging from a passive policy to a major new human rights initiative.105 Given the S/P’s
early response, it is instructive to examine some of the personal influences on Lord to explain his
commitment to changing Kissinger’s mind.
On July 3, 1975, Lord received a dissent channel memo from Alison Palmer, an African
foreign service officer, who criticized the State Department’s ad hoc handling of sanctions
violations particularly for African violators. In the memo, Palmer claimed that violations about
sanctions were being ignored. She urged the State Department to immediately increase
discussion of human rights, in particular the “human suffering experienced by blacks in
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Rhodesia,” and despite the inevitable pushback she must have anticipated, lamented, “I know full
well that the very words ‘moral and humanitarian’ are taboo in our foreign policy decisionmaking process today. This saddens me.”106 Lord responded positively, but revealed his
heightened commitment to human rights: “I have one quarrel with your memorandum – your
allegation/assumption that ‘the very words “moral and humanitarian” are taboo in our foreign
policy decision-making process today.’ I respectfully disagree.”107 Exemplifying his desire to
engage the issue area, Lord chose to respond to Palmer’s critique, as he felt morality and
humanitarianism were a major thrust of the S/P’s analysis. Despite his response, there is still the
question of why Lord would have advocated for black majority rule in southern Africa in a time
when Kissinger was so opposed to the idea, outside of his desire to achieve public and
Congressional support for foreign policy.
One could point to Lord’s early rejection of apartheid in an October 1974 memo where
he asserted the U.S. should “speak or act on other countries’ domestic issues only in serious
cases such as apartheid” or his insistence on holding an analytical staff meeting with Secretary
Kissinger to discuss the very same S/P memo as proof of Lord’s support for incorporating human
rights into diplomacy.108 However, neither of these things would necessarily explain his
personal motivations. It was a combination of Lord’s forward-looking mandate, belief in
relationships, and understanding of the importance of buy-in from Congress and the American
public that convinced him that U.S. human rights policy, particularly towards Rhodesia and
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South Africa, had to change.109 Lord was keenly aware of the importance of relationships in his
role as director of the S/P: those between bureaus, with his own staff, and with Secretary
Kissinger. He focused much more time on these relationships than Kissinger. Revealing this
contrast, Lord remarked that, “on human rights generally, [Kissinger] never had a full
appreciation of the need for public and Congressional support…In many ways he was more
comfortable dealing with authoritarian leaders who could make decisions than in dealing with
messy democrats and parliaments.”110 Similarly, Lord was adept at managing relationships
between bureaus in the State Department; he spoke at length in his oral history about mediating
the concerns of the different bureaus and helping to shape their memos in a manner that would
appeal to Kissinger in order to achieve their original aims. This belief permeated his work. In
relation to the African question, Lord foreshadowed the challenge before him when he asserted
that, “the highest priority this year [1976] is to broaden public understanding and support for our
policies” in a memo meant to brief Kissinger on all pertinent problems the State Department
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faced in 1976111 At the helm of the S/P, Lord served as the mediator between bureaus and a
conduit between the shifting Congressional and public opinion towards U.S. human rights policy
and Kissinger himself throughout the 1970s.
Action, Bureaucracy, and Influence from Lord and the S/P
“An emphasis on humanitarian elements alone was not apt to sway Kissinger.”112
In his oral history, Lord described the mechanisms by which he translated his support for
a shift in U.S. policy towards Africa into real influence on Kissinger. Lord described his early
attempts by saying he “tried to make the case, somewhat naively with Kissinger frankly, that in
addition to geopolitical reasons we should do some shifting of our policy towards South Africa,
we owed it to our domestic audience.”113 In the case of the African question, Lord believed that
policy toward southern Africa should change but he urged the African Bureau to stress “the
geopolitical advantages of changing our African policy. Namely, in competing for influence in
Africa with the Russians” rather than base their memo on the moral imperative.114 In this case,
Lord shared with the African Bureau a desire to back black Africans’ “aspirations for justice and
equality – out of principle and to elevate our standing on the continent,” but through his
knowledge of Kissinger, Lord knew the Bureau must highlight the geopolitical advantages of this
approach in their appeal because “an emphasis on humanitarian elements alone was not apt to
sway Kissinger… he is a balance of power realpolitik type, and isn’t overly preoccupied with
human rights and so on.”115 Yet, despite the ease with which Lord describes this task in his oral
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history two decades after the fact, this was a methodical and bureaucratic process that took place
between the S/P and Kissinger throughout 1974 and 1975 culminating in the 1976 Lusaka
speech.
Moving chronologically through Lord’s oral history and correspondences, it is possible to
trace the S/P’s increased pressure and influence on Kissinger’s calculus towards southern Africa.
In 1975, the State Department’s battle with Congress over linking security assistance to human
rights came to a head with the introduction of Senator Fraser’s Human Rights Reports in the
newly amended Section 502B of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act, which called for cutting off
security assistance to countries that engaged in gross violations of human rights. Under no
circumstance did Kissinger support the limitation of his foreign policy tools or the encroachment
of Congress on his decision-making.116 However, Lord and the S/P advocated for a more
cooperative approach to Congress.
In a September 20, 1975, memorandum titled “Security Assistance and the Human Rights
Report to the Congress,” Lord pushed back against Kissinger calling for his “urgent attention,” a
marked change in rhetoric as it pertained to human rights memorandums of early 1974 and 1975.
Lord first appealed to Kissinger on the basis of their relationship and shared sensibilities,
“personally, as you know, I have long shared your skepticism that withholding security
assistance is a useful lever for improving human rights situations in recipient countries…And I
doubt equally the wisdom of setting our feet upon a slippery slope by judging the human rights
performance of countries around the world.” 117 However, Lord challenged the accepted opinion
of Kissinger with a subsequent warning: “We are faced with a law about whose intent its
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supporters are very clear. If we ignore the spirit of this law we may well pay a substantial price.”
The S/P advocated for compromise by reducing security assistance levels to a few countries with
visibly bad human rights situations in order to convince Congress that “that they should not and
need not” take human rights considerations into account on behalf of the State Department.118 In
her account, Keys criticizes Kissinger’s unfaltering rejection of tying aid to human rights, while
commending Lord and the S/P for their significant opposition and persistent attempts to change
Kissinger’s mind in the best interest of the State Department.119
In addition to its vocal opposition, in late 1975, the S/P began employing the strategy
Lord outlined in his oral history by posing problems within Kissinger’s frameworks, namely the
geopolitical North-South Cold War. In a November 14, 1975, memorandum meant to aid
Kissinger in the forthcoming November 18 U.N. debate on apartheid, the S/P explained that
“South Africa’s unwillingness to deviate from the basics of its radical policy will continue to
bedevil our relations with many African countries…[who] view our opposition to sanctions
against South Africa as a form of cooperation with the SAG [South African government] and at
least tacit acceptance of apartheid.”120 Of greater strategic importance though, the S/P asserted
that continued silence on apartheid and unchanged U.S. policy “has the effect of undermining
support for our positions on a variety of issues in international forums, impeding our relations
with black African states, and presenting opportunities for exploitation by the Soviet Union and
the PRC.”121 The final clause in this strategic warning would be the most important to Secretary
Kissinger.
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During this time period, while Kissinger did offer support for the forces of majority rule
in Rhodesia, his weak statements were often interpreted as support for maintaining international
security and thus the existing Smith regime, given his focus on criticizing Soviet and Cuban
intervention. In one effective example, after an address on Rhodesia which criticized the Smith
regime’s impediment of majority rule—but focused heavily on warning the Soviets and Cubans
about intervening in South Africa—the Rhodesian Defense Minister van der Byl issued a
statement on March 5, thanking the U.S. for their support.122 While this was not the intended
meaning, Kissinger was not amenable to more principled and explicitly clear statements for
black majority rule and against Smith’s white minority regime proposed by Lord and the African
Bureau. His response to these international interpretations may speak to his true ideological
stance at the time.
Upon recognizing the effect of Kissinger’s vague statement through van der Byl’s
“thank-you,” Lord and the S/P pushed for a subsequent statement to clarify the U.S. position.
They proposed that the “statement would go further than what you [Kissinger] previously said, in
that it states the Smith regime ‘should be under no illusion that the United States will in any way
assist its efforts to maintain itself in power against the wishes of the majority.’”123 However,
their appeal to Kissinger did not fit within his framework and overstepped the level of U.S.
morality he was comfortable speaking publicly about. The only marks Kissinger made on the
five-page proposed statement appear below, as a strikethrough on the critical correction intended
to clarify U.S. criticism of Ian Smith’s white minority government:
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The United States continues firmly to support the principles of majority rule in Rhodesia and urges the
regime there to seize what could well be its last opportunity for a peaceful settlement. The regime should
be under no illusion that the United States will in any way assist its efforts to maintain itself in power
against the wishes of the majority.124

As discussed by Keys, Jussi Hanhimäki, Jeremi Suri, and Lord himself, Kissinger refused to
offer support for the more principled arguments for black majority rule or a shift in U.S. policy
towards southern Africa on strictly moral grounds.125
Kissinger’s unwillingness to secede to the moral argument of Lord and the S/P even
when faced with increasing pressure at home and abroad, led Lord and the S/P to again try a
new, but familiar, angle two days later in a March 12, 1976, memorandum smartly titled, “The
Soviets and Southern Africa.” It began with a critical statement foreshadowing Lord’s new
tactic: “You may find his approach to the problem a useful alternative optic for dealing with the
hard choices concerning Africa that are on the table.”126 The alarmist memo was intended to
catch the attention of Secretary Kissinger. In his somewhat over-reaching summary, Lord
warned that “for the first time, the Soviets are in a position to seek a similar polarization in
Southern Africa (US and whites vs. Soviets and blacks),” and goes on to assert that “the
implications of such a polarization for the US global position (as well as for domestic US
opinion) are vastly worse than were those of the Middle East polarization. The equities of the
situation are much more stark; we would stand virtually alone.”127 Most urgently, Lord
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concluded: “the avoidance of polarization must be the primary US goal in our Southern African
policy.... This is all the more urgent since we might not be able to support effectively our
interests in Southern Africa against a Soviet threat short of risking major US-Soviet
hostilities.”128 The goal of this racial warning was to play to Kissinger’s focus on countering
Soviet influence around the globe, by shaping southern Africa into a potential Soviet proxy war.
This was clearly well received by Kissinger. An April 9, 1976, memorandum from Lord to
Kissinger responded to Kissinger’s request promising that Lord would promptly send “an overall
S/P strategy paper which attempts to tie together the Soviet/Cuban and Southern African strands
in a comprehensive, geopolitical fashion.”129 In the few weeks between receiving this memo
and his trip to Africa, this new “alternative optic,” which framed southern Africa as a new U.S.Soviet ideological battleground for the Third World by the S/P, trapped Kissinger and would
ultimately have Lord’s desired effect.
Between April 9 and April 21, Kissinger determined the purpose of his Africa trip. He
would not meet with liberation movement leaders or address the problem of Angolan statehood,
but set two objectives only: “to emphasize the importance that we [the U.S.] attach to the
development and economic progress of Africa,” and “to put the United States behind the
aspirations for majority rule and to begin working out a complete program for achieving it.” For
this decision, Kissinger would leave Washington D.C. for his African trip to a chorus of applause
from thirty-eight African ambassadors.130
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***
In front of a group of regional African leaders assembled by Zambian President Kenneth
Kaunda in Lusaka, Zambia, Kissinger set in motion a new era of U.S. foreign policy in Africa
when he declared Smith’s white minority regime and the South African occupation of Namibia
illegal, explicitly calling for black majority rule.131 In the name of international order and
stability, Kissinger stated that, “America’s responsibilities as a global power give us a strong
interest today in the independence, peace, and well-being of this vast continent…For without
peace, racial justice, and growing prosperity in Africa, we cannot speak of a just international
order.” Most importantly, Kissinger made clear the often intentionally vague U.S. position as it
pertained to black majority rule in southern Africa:
Here in Lusaka, I reaffirm the unequivocal commitment of the United States to human rights, as expressed
in the principles of the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We support selfdetermination, majority rule, equal rights, and human dignity for all the peoples of southern Africa—in the
name of moral principle, international law, and world peace.132

Although it is true that these were not new declarations for the U.S., these principles had not
been stated so explicitly to an African audience. As Andy DeRoche asserts, Lusaka represented
a “turning point in the history of US foreign policy” and the official transition of black majority
rule from a “liberal cause to an operational policy” for the U.S. and Africa.133
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The importance of this shift was felt internationally. While response was reserved in
some facets, audiences believed that this speech signaled a new direction for U.S. Africa policy.
A July 22, 1976, Kansas City Times article summed up much of the hesitant public opinion
surrounding the speech:
The new policy has all the trappings of Kissinger s famous style: The Mid-east “step-by-step” approach,
shuttle diplomacy, shrouds of secrecy and balance-of-power logic. Against the backdrops of the bloodiest
uprising in South Africa’s recent history and the obstacles of presidential politics at home, the fine lines of
the policy have yet to be seen, although the Ford administration strongly backs it, though in a low-profile
manner.134

In a more emotional show of satisfaction, President Kaunda is reported to have begun crying
during Kissinger’s speech in Lusaka. Kaunda admitted that, “some of us were emotionally
charged when you were speaking. We are fully convinced that statement you have just made
represents the sentiments of the great majority of the American people… We couldn’t believe
this was a Secretary of State from Washington.”135 However, the overriding international
sentiment was cautious. In actuality, this was not unfounded.
Kissinger seemed to have realized the importance of his statement in Lusaka after the
fact. In a conversation with President Ford on May 21, Kissinger warned that, “if it [black
majority rule] comes up again, I would say that after Angola, the continent was sliding toward
Communism, that we have given the whites more time to work things out. Don't make it look
like I went out to push majority rule. This was the only way we could stop the radicalization
process.”136 Regardless of Kissinger’s feelings after the speech, Lord’s framing was successful
in achieving both the S/P’s and African Bureau’s policy objectives. The Lusaka speech set in
motion exactly what the Kansas City Times anticipated and the next few years featured multiple
134
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shuttles to Africa to negotiate black majority rule and the fall of apartheid in South Africa, a
contribution often overlooked in Kissinger’s career.
While the subsequent months of shuttle negotiations proved unsuccessful, this does not
negate the S/P’s influence on Secretary Kissinger and the drastic shift in U.S. policy towards
Africa. As further proof for their dichotomous ideologies towards black majority rule, Lord was
pleased with the shift in U.S. policy towards South Africa for the same moral reasons as the
African Bureau, while Secretary Kissinger expressed satisfaction for different reasons even
twenty-three years after the fact:
From the geopolitical perspective, we had achieved the purpose of our African diplomacy. Six months
after the debacle of Angola, the United States was demonstrating a continuing capacity to shape events in
Africa… Rhodesia and Namibia became independent, implementing principles and procedures agreed
during the African shuttles… International war in South Africa was avoided… and there were to be no
other Cuban adventures in the independence struggles of South Africa.137

Perhaps most illustrative of the size of, Kissinger’s and thus the S/P’s, accomplishment is that
Walter Isaacson asserted in his highly critical biography of Kissinger that despite the fact that
Kissinger’s shuttles did not immediately produce results, “the nations of black Africa, whose
attitude toward the U.S. had ranged from wariness to hostility, began to trust Washington as a
force for majority rule. The growing appeal of the Soviet Union was countered.”138
In conclusion, the seeds for black majority rule as a stated policy of U.S. foreign policy
were germinated within the S/P, who from the first signs of Congressional criticism in 1974 took
the lead on the issue of human rights despite Kissinger’s disregard. Between 1974 and
Kissinger’s 1976 speech in Lusaka, Lord pressured Kissinger to conduct analytical staff
meetings and to read policy studies on the effects of apartheid, the moral reasons to shift policy,
and the importance of Congressional and public support in a post-Watergate world. Although
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unsuccessful for an extended period of time, the S/P realized in early 1976 that they must place
the concerns and moral suppositions of the African Bureau within the context of a framework
that appealed to Kissinger: the North-South global Cold War and countering Soviet influence
worldwide. This was the bullet that allowed the S/P to move Kissinger from the opinion that
“Africa was the Africans’ problem” to speaking about America’s moral principle to stand behind
black majority rule to an audience of African leaders. While events in Africa and Congressional
pressure played a role, the State Department’s unexpected 180-degree turn on Africa was greatly
influenced by the S/P’s forward-looking analysis, complimented by the bureaucratic adeptness of
its director, Winston Lord.
V.

Conclusions: The Influence and Effectiveness of Winston Lord and the S/P
This essay has used two case studies to follow the formulation of U.S. foreign policy

within the State Department to determine the influence of both Director Winston Lord and his
Policy Planning Staff on Secretary of State Henry Kissinger from 1973 to 1977, often cited as a
“golden-age for policy planners.” In many cases, the success of the S/P stemmed from its ability
to perform long-term foreign policy analysis while fitting recommendations within Kissinger’s
already established grand strategic frameworks. Although the S/P often challenged Kissinger’s
assumptions and formed opinions, some of their most important successes came from operating
within these frameworks, which prioritized Soviet containment, great power politics, and
international stability. In this sense, the S/P from 1973 to 1977, proved to be both effective and
influential, as Kissinger’s decision-making and speeches often demonstrated a direct link to S/P
analysis.
Specifically, the S/P’s utility in the two case studies differed, exemplifying its diverse
usefulness and mandate afforded under Kissinger. In the words of Kissinger, the S/P’s role in

46

the LOS negotiations was as “the central coordinator of the efforts of the Department and other
agencies to evolve policies and tactics.”139 Here, Lord proactively went beyond the S/P mandate.
The S/P formulated policy but also served as a bureaucratic actor directing all negotiating policy,
which is inherently a day-to-day endeavor, in order to advance long-term strategic goals—its
more typical role. As shown by Kissinger’s 1976 speeches and the eventual treaty, S/P analysis
directly defined U.S. participation in the UNCLOS III negotiations and 1982 treaty.
The S/P’s efforts to promote black majority rule in southern Africa, culminating with
Kissinger’s April 1976 Lusaka speech represented a more drastic watershed moment by which to
analyze the process of S/P policy analysis. The S/P transformed the calculus of Secretary
Kissinger and executed a monumental shift in U.S. foreign policy towards southern Africa. As
early as 1974, the S/P began formulating forward-looking policy in response to changing events
in Africa, as well as pressure from Congress, the American public, and international alike, which
they determined necessitated policy change. More importantly, the S/P advocated for their view
that black majority rule was inevitable and critical in Rhodesia and South Africa despite
Kissinger’s preference for non-interference and support for regional powers. Thus, the 1976
Lusaka speech, announcing a 180-degree-turn on U.S. human rights policy towards southern
Africa, represented the culmination of both the S/P’s analysis and bureaucratic campaign to
change Kissinger’s mind.
The most definitive evidence of the S/P’s influence on Secretary Kissinger may come
directly from the man himself. On January 17, 1977, two days before Kissinger’s tenure as
secretary of state would come to an end he gave a speech to Lord and his staff to present the
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group with Distinguished Honor Award.140 Kissinger started by affirming the renewed
importance he placed on the S/P and the significance of Lord’s appointment:
When I became Secretary I asked Winston to take over the Policy Planning Staff… I believe that over the
last three decades the Policy Planning Staff had fallen into disuse… I never even knew about the Policy
Planning Staff at all, and the Policy Planning Staff was considered sort of a long-hair exercise into which
people were sent because it looked good on organization charts.141

Kissinger addressed the constant State Department struggle to balance operational priorities with
forward-planning strategic priorities: “the hardest thing for those who have to make the decisions
is to gain a perspective. But to gain it in a manner that is compassionate of their problems and
that can be handled within their framework.”142 This essay has highlighted S/P’s ability to
navigate this very concept through its framing of the LOS Treaty as a matter of geopolitical
priority and the question of black majority rule in southern Africa as one that would best ensure
global stability as well as limit Soviet influence in the Third World.
In terms of his regard for the S/P’s contributions, Kissinger’s remarks are no less
celebratory. He acknowledged the critical role of the S/P on a “whole range of issues, cutting
across various bureaus and involving individual bureaus,” and conclusively proved that the S/P
had its own independent influence: “the fact that in general the Staff was somewhat to the left of
me – and did not subside readily, when we did not immediately agree – was inevitable because I
140
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think it is an important function of this Staff to act as a conscience to the Secretary, to the Deputy
Secretary and to those bureaus that admit that they are not already the repository of total
wisdom.”143 In conclusion, Secretary Kissinger’s quote tied together both critical functions of
the S/P as well as the reason for its renewed primacy within the U.S. foreign policy
establishment today: “You cannot be flexible in tactics unless you have a long-range strategy.
Only those people can be effective tactically who have some goals.”144 In other words, the
Policy Planning Staff under the direction of Winston Lord was both influential and successful.
Above all, the S/P proved it was anything but trivial.
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Appendix:

Figure 1: Graphic of LOS Conference Territorial Concepts
Source: Secure Fisheries Frequently Asked Questions, Secure Fisheries,
http://securefisheries.org/faqs-illegal-fishing (accessed March 28, 2017).
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Figure 2: Priority Rank Ordering of Countries by Political/Security Factors
Factors for Ranking: Population, strategic location, strategic raw material wealth, industrial capacity,
presence of US Bases, influence on other countries, potentiality of conflict situation, past and current
identification with the US, and extent of US domestic interest in the country

Figure 3: General Priority Rank Ordering of Countries
Factors for Ranking: All Political/Security Factors listed above combined with Economic/Commercial
Factors
Source: “Priority Rank Ordering of Countries,” August 15, 1975, Box 348, S/P Files of Winston Lord:
Record Group 59 Entry A1-5027, National Archives II, College Park, MD.
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Figure 4: Henry Kissinger's Edits to the March 10, 1976 Memorandum "Suggested Statement on
the Rhodesian Crisis
Source: Winston Lord, Director of Policy Planning, to Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State, Briefing
Memorandum, “Statement on the Rhodesian Crisis,” March 10, 1976, S/P Files of Winston Lord: Record
Group 59 Entry A1-5027, Box 354, National Archives II, College Park, MD.
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Bibliographic Essay
Like so many of my favorite classes at Yale, I started Professor Charles Hill’s graduate
seminar “GLBL 885: World Order” unsure of what I was getting myself into or what I was about
to learn for a semester. There was no way I could have known sitting in the first seminar that
Professor Hill would reignite my love for history, a discipline I had sworn off in favor of Global
Affairs and the study of contemporary foreign policy decision-making since high school. In a
short few weeks I gained an entirely new perspective on international relations and the value of
history, both modern and ancient. In one session we would go from talking about the 1492
Peace of Westphalia to 1960 Kissingerian détente to the 430 B.C. Peloponnesian War, all while
tying themes and lessons together in a completely coherent way.
It was perhaps for the first time in Professor Hill’s class that I understood the value and
importance of a true liberal arts education, and it was that semester when I fell in love with
history and Yale’s history major anew. I immediately decided I needed a much deeper
grounding in history and took almost strictly history courses for the next few semesters.
Through this new academic lens, I began to understand the importance of history for all
contemporary decision-making and strategy. As an athlete and foreign policy buff I have always
been attracted to the word “strategy,” however I became obsessed with the historical and
academic study of strategy as it pertained to diplomacy and the international system. Through a
combination of my studies in Global Affairs and History I became very interested in the
conditions that allow for long-term policy planning in contrast to the arguably piecemeal,
disjointed foreign policy that I grew up surrounded by in the post Cold War United States.
Ideological opinions aside, I was fascinated Henry Kissinger’s successes in single-handedly
formulating and advancing American principles internationally.
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In Professor Hill’s class we talked briefly about his time working under Secretary
Kissinger as a young speechwriter for the Policy Planning Staff (S/P) under the directorship of
Winston Lord (YC ’59). We also discussed how Secretary Kissinger thought about foreign
policy within frameworks and was intensely concerned with not just solving day-to-day
problems but in anticipating future problems. He sought to advance coherent, consistent
American principles in our foreign policy. This is perhaps what Kissinger is best remembered
for, often to a fault. In one class, Professor Hill briefly touched on Kissinger’s “Focus Groups”
or forward looking groups of thinkers (which I would later learn were part of the S/P) who were
tasked with anticipating events in specific regions and developing forward-looking proposals for
how the U.S. would react. I didn’t know it at the time, but this off-hand comment from Professor
Hill would become the subject of my senior essay.
The eight-student seminar culminated in a visit of Dr. Kissinger himself, who spoke with
us for two hours, answering any questions we had (and signing copies of his newest book, World
Order). And it was here where I first learned the name of the S/P and the renewed purpose that
Secretary Kissinger afforded to this long-term foreign policy planning body. This visit coincided
with the gifting of the Henry A. Kissinger Papers to Yale. After further discussion with
Professor Hill I decided I would explore the S/P and long-term foreign policy planning under
Kissinger, hoping to use Yale’s new resources. Without expecting much, I sent a letter to
Professor Hill’s former boss, Winston Lord, thanks to a New York City address in Professor
Hill’s records. Over the next semester and summer, Winston Lord responded incredibly
positively to my request for an interview. We spoke on the phone two or three times about the
S/P and his view of policy planning as a discipline. The first thirty minutes of these
conversations usually had nothing to do with the project, and instead turned to heated debates on
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the World Cup, Yale Soccer, and Lionel Messi’s shortcomings on the international fùtbol stage.
It seemed I had real direction and the essay would write itself.
I returned to Yale in the fall to finish my final season of varsity soccer, to complete my
Global Affairs senior capstone, and to discover this project would be far harder than I originally
expected. I was quickly disappointed as I sorted through the industry of Kissinger scholarship
including the litany of Kissinger memoirs and biographies including White House Years, Years
of Upheaval, and Years of Renewal to find that there were very few mentions of Policy Planning
and even fewer explicit mentions of its effectiveness. Similarly, the Henry A. Kissinger Papers
at Yale proved to be quite difficult to make requests from and even more impossible to search.
Did Kissinger’s memoirs mean that Policy Planning had no effect on his thought process? Was
it simply a think-tank without much direct utility for the advancing policy? The answer, in many
ways, appeared in Ambassador Winston Lord’s Oral Biography conducted by Charles Stuart
Kennedy and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker in 1998 for the Association for Diplomatic Studies and
Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project. The 800-page oral history (which he promised to
add more to if anyone topped his page count) provided great direction and background on his
training and career. In the interview, Lord discussed how when Kissinger was convinced of a
new argument or challenged he would rarely admit where this turnaround came from, instead
opting just to incorporate it into his speeches and briefings with little acknowledgement of its
source. Lord also described many of the areas where the S/P was most effective: economic
issues, human rights policy, and inter-agency negotiations like the Law of the Sea negotiations,
to name a few. While I had my topic of interest and some sources to get started, the major
methodological and academic challenge was determining how to measure the S/P’s influence on
Secretary Kissinger, particularly given his reluctance to acknowledge his influencers.
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Beyond Kissinger’s sparing mentions of Winston Lord and Policy Planning, I also
quickly discovered in my preliminary secondary research that the S/P received little direct study
from historians as well. However, the few mentions of Lord’s S/P were always followed by
praise as one of the most effective tenures of the S/P, despite the 1973 to 1977 period being
coined the “years of upheaval” by Kissinger himself – a time when the established world order
seemed to be crumbling. The near unanimous praise for Lord’s S/P reinforced my notion that I
was onto something important that could inform my larger questions about U.S. foreign policy
formation and execution. The major academic works I initially found on policy planning were
usually contemporaneous journal articles debating its effectiveness in formulating policy and the
utility of long-term policy planning for a secretary of state. Compilations of these studies like
Daniel Drezner’s Avoiding Trivia: The Role of Strategic Planning in American Foreign Policy
and Linda Brady’s article “Planning for Foreign Policy: A Framework for Analysis,” offered
criticisms of the process of policy planning and long-term strategy that was helpful in framing
how I would think about the S/P’s utility and limitations as well as ways to measure Lord’s
effectiveness as director. With the general lack of secondary sources that directly evaluated the
actions of Lord and the S/P from 1973 to 1977, I knew that my primary research would have to
guide the project.
The mechanics of some of my first successful primary research may have taught me more
about the foreign policy establishment and working in government than any amount of reading or
writing could possibly have done so over my four years as a Global Affairs or History major. As
I pulled up to the National Archives II at College Park over Winter Break, I committed what
would be my first of many bureaucratic mistakes as I tried to drive right by the security guard
checking IDs at the entrance. After proceeding through the rest of the exhaustive registration
process with only a few reprimands, I walked up to the Textual Archives room and got some
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assistance with my first pull requests: the S/P (Policy Planning) Files of Winston Lord. And as
soon as my number was placed on the board I realized that the next few days in College Park
would be my very own adventure in bureaucracy. Fifty-five boxes were wheeled out to me and I
realized the Point-and-Shoot camera I brought with me would be far more important than I
originally planned, as I would not have nearly enough time to read what was necessary at the
Archives. So for the next three days my left thumb continually cramped and I filled a 2008
Nikon camera’s memory card three times over as I sorted through every record of over four years
of Lord’s government career. Luckily, based on S/P reports summarizing their own work and
Lord’s 800 page oral history, I knew certain subject areas to prioritize.
This thematic approach proved to be an effective way to examine the decision-making
process of Secretary Kissinger and the influence of Lord’s Policy S/P on these decisions and to
meaningfully engage with secondary scholarship. From Lord’s oral history and refined again
after my visit to NARA, I decided to focus on analyzing the S/P’s role in U.S. Law of Sea
negotiations and shifting U.S. policy towards human rights in southern Africa as these seemed to
be areas that could provide concrete evidence to the oft-cited “golden-age of policy planning.” I
benefitted massively from brainstorming sessions with my advisors Professor R. Joseph Parrott
who forced me to think about how I could actually measure the effectiveness of Lord and the S/P
in formulating policy and influencing the decisions of Secretary Kissinger. Through these case
studies, I would be able to utilize primary documents from the S/P, Winston Lord’s and Henry
Kissinger’s papers complimented by transcripts of State Department Staff Meetings, journalists
responses to major U.S. decisions, Lord’s own testimony in our telephone interviews, and
through event-specific secondary sources. With this structure set, all of my JPEG pictures from
NARA manually rotated and sorted into over 100 individual folders, I began the overwhelming
task of writing, editing, and writing some more.
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It was truly a unique experience to have the opportunity to interview, and get to know a
figure in history that would be the center of senior essay. All too often we can forget in history
the importance of personality, demeanor, and a person’s life outside the scope of their work. In
many ways, these factors can be the most important, as there is certainly an argument that Lord’s
close personal relationship with Secretary Kissinger was the root of his influence and
effectiveness. It was fascinating learning about Lord through my own research and from his own
mouth. My personal knowledge of Lord, as a man, added color to my research in Washington
D.C. as I stumbled across a memo announcing an S/P Fantasy Football Pool knowing Winston
Lord’s affinity for the Washington Redskins and more topically, a personal letter from 1975 on
African race relations sent by his cousin, Philip Pillsbury, Jr., a career Foreign Service Officer
stationed in Africa at the time. Speaking with Lord three or four times over the year was
certainly the most enjoyable part of the senior essay process.
I owe an enormous amount of gratitude to both my parents and the rest of my family,
who convinced this second-semester senior the utility and importance of this project, even when
I could not fathom reading another page and who made all of this—and I mean all of this—
possible for me in my life. Thank you to my advisors Professor Paul Kennedy and Professor R.
Joseph Parrott who were incredible resources when it came to navigating the industry of
Kissinger scholarship, the National Archives, and all other facets of thesis writing. Thank you to
Professor Charles Hill for spurring this project on and introducing me to both my topic and to
Winston Lord himself. Most importantly, this project could never have happened without Mr.
Winston Lord, who restored my reverence for government and the foreign policy institution with
his compassion, friendliness, and willingness to assist a Yale senior only a few graduating
classes removed from himself.
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